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DISSECTION OF A MALIGNANCY: THE CONVENIENCE OF THE
EMPLOYER DOCTRINE
I. Introduction
Section 61 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter referred
to as the "Code"] states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided .... gross income
means all income from whatever source derived .... " This definition readily
lends itself to the interpretation that compensation received in a form other than
cash may also be considered gross income. In accordance with this interpretation,
the Internal Revenue Regulations [hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations"]
have long held that the fair market value of a thing taken in payment for services
rendered is to be included as income.' Gross income may be realized, therefore,
in the form of cash, services, meals, lodging, stock, or other property.2
A determination of the amount of gross income is the starting point for
computation of the personal income tax. The sum total of all income items in-
cluded in gross income must be reported when an individual files his tax return,
and taxable income is then computed by subtracting allowable deductions from
this reported amount.' Thus, it is vital to initially determine whether a particular
item is included or excluded from gross income.' The Code and attending Regu-
lations provide for numerous exclusions of items from taxable gross income,5
regardless of whether the income item was received in cash or in an equivalent of
cash.6 Of specific concern to this Note are the exclusions in the Code or Regula-
tions pertaining to meals or lodging given to an employee: (a) the rental value
of lodging furnished or rental allowance paid to a minister;7 (b) the value
of quarters and subsistence or allowances received therefor by members of the
Armed Forces, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service; S (c)
amounts received as cost-of-living allowances by government civilian employees
stationed outside the continental United States and by personnel of the Foreign
Service;9 and, (d) meals or lodging furnished for the convenience of the em-
ployer."
1 Compare Treas Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (1) (1957) with Treas. Reg. 33, art. 4 (1918).
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1957).
3 See 1 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GiFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 1.02
(1969); Lipton, Gross Income - The Starting Point in the Preparation of Any Return, 68
DICK. L. REv. 169 (1964); Wren, New Concepts of Income Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, 8 OKLA. L. REv. 59 (1955).
4 There are important distinctions between a reduction of gross income and a deduction:
Although the propostion [sic] is dubious enough in history, equity, and economics,
the Supreme Court's view has long been that deductions are a matter of "legislative
grace." Therefore, the taxpayer must be able to point to the specific statutory lan-
guage which grants the deduction. Moreover, he must be prepared to establish that
there is no public policy which would be "frustrated" by the deduction. Finally, a
deduction is allowable only within the strict rules of payment or accrual, not in rela-
tion to the item of income to which it is related. For any one of these reasons,
therefore, it may be important to distinguish between a mere "deduction" and an
item which is actually a reduction of gross income.
1 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 3, § 1.02(5).
5 See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 101-21 and Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1 to 1.121-4
(1967).
6 2 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN § 11.01 (rev. ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 107; Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1 (1963).
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b) (1957).
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 912; Treas. Reg. § 1.912-1, -2 (1959).
10 INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 119; Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (1964). Statutory subsistence
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The development of these particular exclusions has taken different forms.
The rental value of lodging furnished to a minister as part of his compensation
has long been exempt from gross income by statute." More recently, any rental
allowance paid directly to a minister as part of his compensation has been added
to this statutory exclusion, at least to the extent that such allowance is used by
the minister to rent or provide himself with a home. 2 The exclusions pertaining
to meals or lodging furnished to federal government civilian and military person-
nel, 3 and to other employees for the convenience of their employers, initially
developed as exceptions to the general rule that compensation paid in a form
other than money was to be included in gross income, rather than as specific stat-
utory exclusions from gross income.
The non-statutory origin for these latter exclusions, the "convenience of the
employer doctrine," exempts benefits received in the form of meals or lodging
from federal income taxation when such benefits are furnished by an employer
primarily for his own convenience.' One is hard pressed to find an expressed
rationale for the concept either in case law or in the administrative and legislative
history behind the now codified doctrine. The reason for the rule would seem
to be grounded in the belief that an injustice would be visited upon an employee
if he were required to pay a tax on the value of meals or lodging furnished to
him by his employer, when such meals or lodging were provided more for the
benefit and convenience of his employer than for himself.
This Note will discuss in detail the convenience of the employer doctrine,
tracing its development through the case law and Regulations prior to its codifi-
cation, examining the history of that codification, and dissecting the statutory
doctrine according to its acknowledged requirements.
II. The Doctrine in Its Infancy
The convenience of the employer doctrine is not statutory in origin, but
began as a product of administrative regulations and rulings. The general rule
of imposing an income tax on the rental value of living quarters furnished to an
individual, in addition to a salary, was proclaimed administratively as early as
1914."5 Importantly, the first evidence of the convenience of the employer
doctrine also appeared in that year.'" The Commissioner was asked to make a
ruling concerning the "[i]ncome tax liability and withholding requirements in
connection with quarters . . .furnished or paid by the Government to officers
and employees.""' After ruling that the money value of the number of rooms
furnished should be reported as income, the ruling stated:
allowances given to police officers were also excluded from gross income for the taxable years
1954 through 1958. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 120, 68A Stat. 39 '(repealed 1958); Treas.
Reg. § 1.120-1 (1956).
11 Compare INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 107(1) with Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, §
213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 239.
12 INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 107(2).
13 See text accompanying notes 15-40 infra.
14 See J. CHOMMiE, THE LAW oF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23 (1968).
15 T.D. 2090, 16 TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 259, 263 (1914).




When quarters are furnished in kind, of a greater number of rooms than
the number allowed by law, it is to be assumed that the excess number is
assigned for the convenience of the Government, and the money equivalent
only of the number of rooms allowed by law shall be returned as income.'
(Emphasis added.)
The government employee was not required to report as income the fair rental
value of the quarters furnished for the benefit and convenience of his employer.
The first apparent application of the doctrine appeared five years later. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue [hereinafter referred to as the "Bureau"] ruled that
a person in the service of the American Red Cross, who received a maintenance
allowance but no cash compensation, need only report as income the amount, if
any, received for maintenance in excess of his actual living expenses. 9 Following
on the heels of this pronouncement, the Bureau specifically recognized the con-
venience of the employer doctrine in a ruling which dealt with seamen who were
furnished board and lodging in addition to their regular cash compensation."
The doctrine finally found its way into the "law" of federal income taxation as
an amendment to article 33 of Regulation 45:
When living quarters such as camps are furnished to employees for the
convenience of the employer, the ratable value need not be added to the
cash compensation of the employee, but where a person receives as com-
pensation for services rendered a salary and in addition thereto living
quarters, the value to such person of the quarters furnished constitutes in-
come subject to tax.2 1
This language appeared virtually unchanged in every succeeding Regulation for
the next twenty years.22
While the early Regulations spoke only in terms of lodging furnished to an
employee, it became evident that furnished meals were also within the scope of
the convenience of the employer doctrine. A 1920 ruling held that "supper
money" paid to an employee, who performed extra labor for the employer after
business hours, was not considered to be additional compensation, but paid for
the convenience of the employer.23 A year later the Bureau held that where
employees engaged in fishing and canning were furnished with meals and lodging
by their employer for the latter's convenience, the value of such benefits need
not be included in the computation of the employees' net income.24 However,
meals were not included in the Regulations concerned with the convenience of
the employer doctrine until 1940.25
18 Id.
19 O.D. 11, 1 CuM. BULL. 66 (1919).
20 Board and lodging furnished seamen in addition to their cash compensation is
held to be supplied for the convenience of the employer and the value thereof is not
required to be reported in such employees' income tax returns. O.D. 265, 1 CuM.
BULL. 71 (1919) (emphasis added).
21 Treas. Reg. 45, art. 33 (1920 ed.), T.D. 2992, 2 CuM. BULL. 76 (1920).
22 Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (a)-3 (1939); Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-3 (1939); Treas.
Reg. 94, art. 22(a)-3 (1936); Treas. Reg. 86, art. 22(a)-3 '(1935); Treas. Reg. 77, art. 53
(1933); Treas. Reg. 74, art. 53 (1929); Treas. Reg. 69, art. 33 (1926); Treas. Reg. 65, art.
33 '(1924); Treas. Reg. 62, art. 33 (1922).
23 O.D. 514, 2 Cum. BULL. 90 (1920).
24 O.D. 814, 4 CUM. BULL. 84 (1921).
25 See text accompanying notes 83-85 infra.
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In 1925 the first case dealing with the developing convenience of the
employer rule - Jones v. United States" - made its way to the courts. The
litigation involved a commissioned Army officer who was furnished government
quarters while performing duties at the military post to which he was assigned,
and given a cash allowance for the rental of quarters when his duties required
him to live away from the post. The officer included, under protest, the rental
value of quarters occupied by him at the military post and the cash received
as commutation of quarters during a four-month absence from post as
items of gross income on his tax return. In its analysis, the Court
of Claims eliminated any distinction between quarters furnished in kind
and allowances given to rent quarters by recognizing the inherent right
of officers to public quarters when available at their military post and,
when not so available, their right to commutation of quarters in money."
Special attention was given to the circumstances which accompany military life,
including the fact that troops and officers are subject to call for service day and
night, requiring the government to furnish housing facilities for troops and officers
if an army is to be maintained." The court concluded that no income had been
realized by the officer in the form of quarters or allowance for quarters, stating
that: -
If the nature of the services require [sic] the furnishing of a house for their
proper performance, and without it the service may not properly be ren-
dered, the house so furnished is part of the maintenance of the general
enterprise... and forms no part of the individual income of the laborer.n29
Although the convenience of the employer doctrine, was never mentioned by
name, the rationale in Jones suggests an inherent recognition of the doctrine.
The Bureau subsequently issued rulings which expanded the exemption
allowed for officers in Jones to include enlisted men and non-commissioned
officers,"° members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and
Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service,31 the Army Nurse Corps and the
Navy Nurse Corps,2 the National Guard,"3 and the Reserve Officers' Training
Corps." In 1926 the Regulations recognized, for the first time, an exemption
for many of the above groups," and the present Regulations contain reference to
these government employees:
Subsistence and uniform allowances granted commissioned officers, chief
warrant officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel of the Armed
26 60 Ct. CI. 552 (1925).
27 Id. at 569.
28 Id. at 569-70.
29 Id. at 575.
30 I.T. 2219, IV-2 Cum. BULL. 41 (1925).
31 I.T. 2232, IV-2 Cum. BULL. 144 (1925). See also Mim. 3413, V-1 Cum. BULL. 29
(1926); I.T. 3823, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 28.
32 I.T. 3420, 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 40.
33 Rev. Rul. 60-65, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 21.
34 Rev. Rul. 66-3, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 19.
35 The value of quarters furnished Army and Navy officers, members of the Coast
Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service, or amounts received as
commutation of quarters by such officers or members, do not constitute taxable income.
Treas. Reg. 69, art. 33 '(1926).
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Forces, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service of the
United States, and amounts received by them as commutation of quarters,
are to be excluded from gross income. Similarly, the value of quarters or
subsistence furnished to such persons is to be excluded from gross income.3 6
Government employees stationed outside the continental United States and
those in certain fields of foreign service are also exempted from reporting as
income meals or lodging furnished or cash allowances received in lieu of such
benefits." In 1930' and 1931" Congress enacted legislation authorizing the
President and the Secretary of State to grant "post allowances" or "cost-of-living
allowances" to those government employees working abroad. The initial test
applied to determine whether to tax such allowances as income was the same
one that was utilized in other early convenience of the employer cases: whether
the prime purpose of such allowances or benefits in kind was to grant additional
comforts to the employees, or to insure that the employees properly performed
their duties for the employer. If the former was shown to be the purpose of the
allowances, the value thereof had to be reported as income. If their purpose was
shown to be for the convenience of the employer, they did not have to be reported
as income."
Although the convenience of the employer doctrine is said to have its
origin in Jones and the early rulings involving military personnel,4 the Code
and Regulations came to treat the doctrine as distinct from the exemptions
specifically granted to government personnel. A type of "per se" convenience
of the employer doctrine has developed for the treatment of quarters and
subsistence benefits furnished this latter group. Neither the Code nor Regulations
providing the exemption for such benefits given to military personnel specify
that quarters and subsistence benefits be for the convenience of the employer,
but simply exempt all such benefits from gross income.4" In similar fashion, the
exemption for cost-of-living allowances granted government employees stationed
abroad has no requirement that the benefits be furnished for the convenience
of the employer.43 Despite the lack of specific language, the implication would
seem to be that such benefits are inherently for the convenience of the government
because of the peculiar circumstances present in the governmental employment
situations under consideration.
Thus, despite common origins, application of the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine itself finally came to center upon employees other than military
personnel or those employed in the foreign service of the federal government.
The various employment situations of these employees have provoked the de-
velopment of the law surrounding the statutory doctrine today.
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b) (1957).
37 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 912.
38 Act of June 26, 1930, ch. 622, 46 Stat. 818.
39 Act of February 23, 1931, ch. 276, § 3, 46 Stat. 1207.
40 See G.C.M. 12300, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 30 (1933); G.C.M. 13442, XIII-2 Cum. BULL.
119 (1934), revoked G.C.M. 14710, XIV-1 CuM. BULL. 44 (1935); G.C.M. 14836, XIV-1
Cum. BULL. 45 (1935).
41 See Gutkin & Beck, Some Problems in "Convenience of the Employer," 36 TAXEs 153,
154 (1958).
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b) (1957).
43 INT. REV. CODa of 1954, § 912; Treas. Reg. § 1.912-1(a) (1959).
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III. The Codified Doctrine and Its Requirements
The convenience of the employer doctrine was given statutory recognition
in 1954 as a specific exclusion from gross income. This provision - section 119
of the Code - reads as follows:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value
of any meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer for the con-
venience of the employer, but only if -
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business
premises of the employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept
such lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition of
his employment.
In determining whether meals or lodging are furnished for the con-
venience of the employer, the provisions of an employment contract or of a
State statute fixing terms of employment shall not be determinative of
whether the meals or lodging are intended as compensation.
The statute has been construed to require six prerequisites which the tax-
payer must fulfill in order to qualify for the exemption: (1) there must be an
employer-employee relationship; (2) the benefits must be given for the con-
venience of the employer; (3) the employee must be required to accept lodging
as a condition of his employment; (4) the benefits must be furnished without
charge; (5) the meals or lodging must be furnished in kind; and (6) they must
be furnished on the business premises of the employer.
A. Employer-Employee Relationship
In order for meals or lodging to be furnished to an employee for the con-
venience of the employer, and the statutary exclusion to apply, an employer-
employee relationship must exist. A significant number of cases have considered
the question of whether a partnership-partner relationship can qualify under the
basic employer-employee requirement of the doctrine. The first case dealing with
this question was a Tax Court decision - George A. Papineau.'" It involved a
partner who, as manager of a hotel for his partnership, received meals and
lodging at the hotel, in addition to a salary for the managerial service he per-
formed. In his income tax return the taxpayer did not report the value of such
meals and lodging as income and, as a result, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue found a deficiency in the taxpayer's return. The Commissioner's argu-
ment was that the taxpayer could not rely on Regulations promulgating the
convenience of the employer doctrine because he had received his meals and
lodging as a partner, and a partner could not be considered an employee under
the doctrine.45 The court did not discuss the case in terms of "convenience of
the employer" but chose instead to base its decision on precedent holding that a
partner working for his partnership was, in fact, working for himself, and
44 16 T.C. 130 (1951).
45 Id. at 131-32.
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therefore could neither employ nor pay compensation to himself.46 The court
concluded:
It is at once apparent that if a partner is a proprietor who can not
employ 'himself or compensate himself by a salary for services rendered to
himself, neither can he compensate himself or create income for himself by
furnishing himself meals and lodging.47
Thus, although Papineau found that a partner could not be an employee of his
partnership, the case allowed an exclusion for meals and lodging.
During the next few years, the Tax Court continued to follow the rationale
of Papineau" but the Bureau and courts of appeal took another approach. In
1952, the Bureau issued a nonacquiescence in the decision,49 and a year later
Revenue Ruling 80 held that, in factual patterns such as the Papineau situation,
meals and lodging furnished to a partner must be included in the manager-
partner's share of net profits of the hotel business.5" This administrative action
was followed by decisions from four circuit courts of appeal, all in disagreement
with the holding of Papineau. The first of these cases, Commissioner v. Doak,"
was heard by the Fourth Circuit and established the precedent for the cases that
followed. The taxpayers, husband and wife, were partners in a hotel business
and, because of their duties as co-operators of the hotel, they found it necessary
to live and eat most of their meals there. On their tax return they deducted,
as a business expense of the partnership, the expenses attributable to the meals
and lodging they received at the hotel. The court held that this was not an
allowable deduction,52 and then addressed itself to the question of whether the
convenience of the employer doctrine was applicable under the circumstances
presented in the case. It granted that, if the taxpayers occupied an employee
status, they would be allowed an exemption under the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine." Nevertheless, it held that such an exemption was not available
because "[t]hey were not . . .either employers or employees; instead they were
husband and wife owning the entire business as partners."'54
The reasoning given in Doak was relied on in Commissioner v. Moran,55
where the Eighth Circuit held that the convenience of the employer doctrine
pertains only to situations wherein the employer and employee are two taxable
entities, and that the doctrine has no application where the one furnishing meals
and lodging is the same taxpayer receiving them. 6 The court found that a
partner was not an entity distinct from the partnership; therefore, the con-
venience of the employer doctrine did not apply. The philosophy behind these
46 See Estate of S. U. Tilton, 8 B.T.A. 914, 917 (1927).
47 George A. Papineau, 16 T.C. at 132 (1951).
48 See, e.g., Thomas Robinson, 31 T.C. 65, 69 (1958); Leo B. Wolfe, 24 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 663, 664 (1955); Richard E. Moran, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 681 (1955) ; Everett Doak,
24 T.C. 569, 570-71 (1955).
49 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
50 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 62.
51 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956).
52 Id. at 709.
53 Id. at 707.
54 Id.
55 236 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1956).




two cases was given approval by the Tenth Circuit in United States u. Briggs",
and by the Third Circuit in Commissioner v. Robinson."6
It is to be noted that each of the above-mentioned cases dealt with taxable
years before passage of the Code. The Code introduced two new concepts
regarding the tax treatment given partnerships, and these have indirectly affected
the application of section 119 in cases involving benefits provided to partners.
One of the new provisions allows an unincorporated business enterprise to elect
to be taxed as a domestic corporation.6 0 Section 1361(c) provides that, if the
election is made, each owner of an interest in the partnership is considered a
shareholder of the "corporation.""1 Since a shareholder and his corporation are
separate entities,62 so long as the shareholder (partner) is functioning as an
employee of the corporation (partnership), it appears he has, at least in form,
fulfilled the employer-employee requirement of section -119. This statutory
provision was applied to the convenience of the employer doctrine by the Internal
Revenue Service'3 [hereinafter referred to as the "Service"] in a 1963 ruling.
Revenue Ruling 63-32 stated that a partnership, if it has elected under section
1361 to be taxed as a domestic corporation, may deduct the cost of meals or
lodging furnished to a partner-employee and the partner-employee is eligible for
an exemption from gross income (provided, of course, that the other require-
ments of section 119 are fulfilled).4 However, the section 1361 approach would
seem to imply that, if a partnership did not choose to make the appropriate
election, a partner could not be eligible for section 119 consideration.6"
The second provision of the Code, pertaining to tax treatment of partner-
ships, and the application of section 119 to them, is section 707. Subsection (a)
of this provision states that:
If a partner engages in a transaction with a partnership other than in
his capacity as a member of such partnership, the transaction shall . .. be
considered as occurring between the partnership and one who is not a
partner.
6
A 1968 Fifth Circuit case, Armstrong v. Phinney,67 utilized this provision to over-
come the arguments in the cases relying on Doak. The case involved a ranch
manager who was five per cent owner of a partnership which operated a cattle
ranch. The partner-manager did not report as income the value of meals and
lodging furnished to him as manager of the ranch. In its interpretation of
58 238 F.2d 53, 54'(10th Cir. 1956).
59 273 F.2d 503, 504 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 810 (1960).
60 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1361.
61 Id. § 1361(c).
62 See Wilhelm v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 16, 20 (D. Wyo. 1966).
63 The title of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was changed in 1953 to the "Internal
Revenue Service."
64 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 146, 147.
65 Wilson v. United States, 376 F.2d 280, 296 (Ct. Cl. 1967), a decision based on a
taxable year after the passage of section 1361, failed to indicate that the partnership involved
had elected to be taxed as a domestic corporation. On the issue of the exclusion of meals
and lodging furnished to the partners as managers of a ranch, the court followed the pre-
Code "Doak-Moran approach" that a partner could not be an employee of his partnership,
and refused to allow the section 119 exclusion.
66 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 707(a).
67 394 F.2d 661 "(5th Cir. 1968).
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section 707, the court rejected the idea that a partnership and its partners were
one inseparable legal unit. Section 707 was said to have adopted an "entity
theory" whereby a partner could be viewed as distinct from the partnership if
he acted in a capacity outside of his role as partner.6" "Consequently, it is now
possible for a partner to stand in any one of a number of relationships with his
partnership, including... employee-employer." 69 Having established a partner's
right to participate in such a relationship, the court remanded the case to see if
the ranch manager was acting outside his capacity as partner.0
Thus, the preceding discussion would indicate that there have been at least
four different approaches to the problem of determining the availability of a
section 119 exemption for partners: (a) the "Papineau approach"; (b) the
"Doak-Moran approach"; (c) the "section 1361 election approach"; and (d) the
"Armstrong approach." Until the other circuits have had the opportunity to
consider the effect of section 707 on the employer-employee requirement, this
particular aspect of the convenience of the employer doctrine will remain in a
state of flux. This author would suggest that the "Armstrong approach" seems
to be the better view and the one most likely to be followed today.
The legislative history accompanying section 707(a) states that the new
provision
provides the general rule that a partner who engages in a transaction
with the partnership, other than in his capacity as a partner, shall be treated
as though he were an outsider. Such transactions include . . . the render-
ing of services by the partner to the partnership .... 
7 1
This language seems to indicate that the draftsmen of section 707 recognized the
possibility of a partner having an employer-employee relationship with his
partnership. This being true, the judicial approaches advanced in Papineau,
Doak and Moran should yield to the Armstrong decision and the relationship it
establishes.
Since the approach of section 1361 as pronounced in Revenue Ruling 63-32
68 Id. at 663.
69 Id. at 663-64.
70 Id. at 664.
71 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 386 (1954). The argumentative effect of this
language might be mitigated by the following statement found in the Conference Committee
Report:
Both the House provisions and the Senate amendment provide for the use of the
"entity" approach in the treatment of the transactions between a partner and a part-
nership which are described above. No inference is intended, however, that a partner-
ship is to be considered as a separate entity for the purpose of applying other pro-
visions of the internal revenue laws if the concept of the partnership as a collection
of individuals is more appropriate for such provisions. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954) (emphasis added).
The Armstrong court implicitly refers to this portion of the legislative history with these
remarks:
The terms "outsider' and "one who is not a partner" are not defined by Con-
gress; neither is the relationship between section 707 and other sections of the Code
explained. However, we have found nothing to indicate that Congress intended that
this section is not to relate to section 119. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F. 2d 661, 663
(5th Cir. 1968).
In a footnote explaining this passage of the opinion, the court goes on to say: "We are con-
vinced that section 119 is not a provision where 'the concept of the partnership as a collection
of individuals is more appropriate' . . . ." Id. at 663 n.8.
[Centennial, 1969]
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assumes that the only time a partner can possibly claim an exemption under
section 119 is when his partnership elects to be treated as a domestic corporation,
it severely limits a partner's opportunity to take advantage of the convenience of
the employer doctrine. The "Armstrong approach," in its application of section
707, totally avoids the limitations in qualifying for corporation-shareholder
treatment under section 1361,2 and thus best represents the appropriate judicial
rationale for allowing partners the statutory exclusion of section 119.
This new "entity theory" brought to the law of federal income taxation by
section 707 is no panacea for partners seeking an exemption under the con-
venience of the employer doctrine. It must first be shown that the partner is
acting outside his capacity as a member of the partnership for the existence of an
employer-employee relationship to be established, and then the remaining pre-
requisites of section 119 must be proven before the partner-employee can be
entitled to the exemption he seeks.
B. For the Convenience of the Employer
1. The Concept Prior to Section 119
The phrase "convenience of the employer" can be used in two senses, as a
doctrine and as a requirement. As a doctrine, "convenience of the employer"
represents the rule of taxation which allows the value of meals or lodging
furnished to an employee by his employer to be excluded from gross income.
As a requirement, "convenience of the employer" represents one or more of the
elements needed to bring the doctrine into effect." In order to properly analyze
the convenience of the employer requirement, as well as the other requirements
expressed in section 119, it is necessary to first discuss the convenience of the
employer doctrine as it existed prior to the passage of the Code.
Beginning with early administrative rulings, it was found that some factual
patterns were more susceptible than others to an application of the convenience
of the employer doctrine. A 1921 ruling provides an excellent example of those
factors which were found to be essential to the doctrine. 4 The Bureau had been
asked whether meals and lodging furnished to hospital employees constituted ad-
ditional compensation, and ruled that:
Where the employees of a hospital are subject to immediate service
on demand at any time during the twenty-four hours of the day and on
that account are required to accept quarters and meals at the hospital, the
value of such quarters and meals may be considered as being furnished for
72 See INT. RaV. Cona of 1954, § 1361(b) where the two major requirements that a
partnership must meet to take advantage of the election are stated: the partnership may not
consist of more than fifty members and no partner having more than a ten per cent share in
the partnership may own more than a ten per cent interest in any other partnership taxable
as a domestic corporation.
73 This is a vital distinction because the phrase "convenience of the employer," before
passage of the Code, had the connotation of both doctrine and requirement, i.e., the require-
ment was the doctrine and vice versa. Under section 119 the convenience of the employer
doctrine has many requirements, one of which is that meals or lodgings be furnished for the
"convenience of the employer."
74 O.D. 915, 4 CuM. BULL. 85 (1921). See I.T. 2253, V-1 CUM; BULL. 32 (1926).
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the convenience of the hospital, and does not represent additional compensa-
tion to the employees. On the other hand, where the employees are on duty
a certain specified number of hours each day and could, if they so desired,
obtain meals and lodging elsewhere than in the hospital and yet perform
the duties required of them by such hospital, the ratable value of the board
and lodging furnished is considered additional compensation.
75
The early rulings also illustrated a negative element in the convenience of
the employer doctrine - meals and lodging had to be furnished for non-compen-
satory reasons. In 1921 the Bureau held that, where board and lodging were
received by a domestic servant as part of his compensation, the employee must
report as income the amount which he would have to pay for such board and
lodging outside his employer's household." Similarly, in a situation where
employees of the Indian Service were furnished buildings for occupancy, the
Bureau ruled that the test to determine if such benefits were taxable would be
based upon whether the appropriation providing for the expenditures was one
set aside to fund compensation for employees:
If the value of such quarters has been charged to the appropriation from
which the compensation of such employees is paid . . . then such rental
value is additional compensation to the employees and should be included
together with the cash compensation received as income.
77
This test gave way to one even more stringent: although the appropriations were
not earmarked for compensatory purposes, if the Department of the Interior
considered the value of quarters furnished to employees of the Indian Bureau
as additional compensation, it had to be reported as income.7"
Judicial determinations dealing with the elements of the convenience of the
employer doctrine initially were unconcerned with the compensatory elements
involved in a given situation. The first case to clearly delineate the factual situa-
tions which lend themselves to a finding that certain benefits are provided for the
convenience of the employer was Arthur Benaglia.9 The taxpayer was the
manager in charge of several resort hotels. He and his wife occupied a suite in
one of the hotels and received their meals there. He failed to include the value
of meals and lodging received in his computation of gross income and was issued
a deficiency notice by the Commissioner. The court held that the meals and
lodging were not given to the taxpayer as compensation nor for his personal
convenience, comfort or pleasure, but solely because he could not otherwise
perform his managerial duties."0 His duties were continuous and hotel guests
could demand his presence at any time, day or night. His residence in the hotel
was a specific condition of his employment, for the owners of the hotel would
not hire a manager unless he lived there. Together, these factors constituted
75 O.D. 915, 4 Cum. BULL. 85-86 (1921).
76 O.D. 874, 4 CUm. BULL. 348 (1921).
77 O.D. 914, 4 CUM. BULL. 85 (1921). See also I.T. 2692, XII-1 Cum. BULL. 28 (1933)
where Veterans Administration employees were furnished quarters paid for out of a "salaries
and expenses" appropriation, and the value of the quarters had to be included in gross income.
78 I.T. 2051, 111-2 Cum. BULL. 55 (1924).
79 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
80 36 B.T.A. at 839.
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"convenience of the employer."" Benaglia was followed in two federal district
court cases,8 2 which were similarly concerned with a manager subject to continu-
ous and immediate call.
In 1940 the Regulations pertaining to "compensation paid other than in
cash"8 were amended with regard to the language governing the convenience of
the employer doctrine:
If a person receives as compensation for services rendered a salary and
in addition thereto living quarters or meals, the value to such person of the
quarters and meals so furnished constitutes income subject to tax. If, how-
ever living quarters or meals are furnished to employees for the convenience
of the employer, the value thereof need not be computed and added to the
compensation otherwise received by the employees.84
As explained by the Commissioner, the purpose of the amendment was to clarify
the Bureau's position concerning the circumstances under which the value of
meals or lodging could be excluded from gross income85 The language, although
different from that used in previous Regulations governing the doctrine," actually
seemed to be a mere repetition of the philosophy expressed therein. In further
explanation, however, the Commissioner stated that under these new Regulations
the requirement of convenience of the employer would be satisfied if meals or
lodging were furnished to an employee who was required to accept the items
in order to perform his duties properly." This did indeed help to clarify the
requirements for the convenience of the employer doctrine.
Neither the regulations nor the Commissioner's subsequent explanation of
them clarified one major question: Is the convenience of the employer doctrine
applicable when meals or lodging are furnished not only for the employer's
convenience, but also to compensate the employee?8 A novel approach to this
question was given in Olin 0. Ellis. 9 The president of a realty corporation was
given lodging in an apartment building owned by the corporation; he also
assumed the duties of a day and night manager of the apartments. The court
found that the taxpayer's managerial position required him to live in the apart-
ment building, and held that the living quarters furnished to him "were to some
, 81 Id. at 841. But see Charles A. Frueauff, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934); Fontaine Fox, 30
B.T.A. (1934); Ralph Kitchen, 11 B.T.A. 855 (1928).
82 Greene v. Kanne, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1141, 1143 (D. Hawaii 1938); Renton v. Kanne,
23 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1143 (D. Hawaii 1938). Cf. Lloyd N. Farnham, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
898, 899 '(1947). But cf. Herman Martin, 44 B.T.A. 185 (1941).
83 Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-3 (1939).
84 T.D. 4965, 1940-1 GuM. BULL. 13.
85 Mini. 5023, 1940-1 Cusm. BULL. 14.
86 See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
87 Mira. 5023, 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 14, 15; accord, R. Shad Bennett, 11 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1481, 1489 (1942).
88 Mim. 5023 does contain language that might be construed as answering this question:
"If ... the living quarters or meals furnished are not compensatory or are furnished for the
convenience of the employer, the value thereof need not be added to the compensation other-
wise received by the employee." 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 14, 15 (emphasis added). Although it
could be implied that the word "or" is used disjunctively rather conjunctively, the explanation
given by the Commissioner is too ambiguous to be relied upon as authority for the proposition
that the convenience of the employer doctrine has application even when the meals or lodging
have a compensatory purpose, in addition to being for the employer's convenience. But cf.
Gutkin & Beck, supra note 41, at 155.
89 6 T.C. 138 (1946).
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extent for his employer's convenience."9' It was found that the case was to be
distinguished from Benaglia which involved living quarters furnished "solely"
for the convenience of the employer. Here the taxpayer even admitted that the
living quarters were furnished partly for the corporation's convenience and partly
to compensate him for his work.91 The court decided that the rental value of
the apartment should be excluded from gross income to the extent that it was
provided for the employer's convenience, and the remaining part should be
reported as income to the taxpayer.
92
Ellis was exceptional for its time. The cases appearing shortly thereafter,
for all practical purposes, ignored the compensatory nature of meals or lodging
furnished for the convenience of the employer, and continued to place the
emphasis on the more positive requirements of the doctrine."2 Illustrative of this
approach was a 1948 Tax Court decision - Hazel W. Carmichael.4 The case
involved five taxpayers who were employed at a government housing project by
a public construction corporation. Each employee received his lodging free but
failed to report it as income on his tax return. The rental value of the lodging
was treated by the corporation as an expense for compensation paid to the
employees; nevertheless, the court ignored the compensatory aspect and decided
whether or not all the requirements for the convenience of the employer doctrine
had been met by applying the following test:
"Convenience of the employer" has been generally heretofore inter-
preted as meaning not merely the request, direction or pleasure of the
employer but that the inherent nature of the employment requires that
the employee occupy premises supplied by the employer, in which the occu-
pation of the designated quarters becomes an inherent part of the services
performed. Under such circumstances the rental value of the quarters occu-
pied is not included in the employees [sic] taxable income. However, if
living in the supplied quarters is not an essential element of the taxpayer's
employment, even though such occupancy may be requested by the em-
ployer, and convenient to the employer, the rental value of the occupied
quarters becomes a part of the employees taxable income.95
In 1950 the Bureau, in an attempt to establish a definite test for the con-
venience of the employer doctrine, issued Mim. 6472:
The "convenience of the employer" rule is simply an administrative test
to be applied only in cases in which the compensatory character of such
benefits is not otherwise determinable. It follows that the rule should not be
applied in any case in which it is evident from the other circumstances in-
volved that the receipt of quarters or meals by the employee represents
compensation for services rendered.96
The promulgation also contained an example of a situation in which the Bureau's
90 Id. at 139.
91 Id. at 140.
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., Henry M. Lees, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1953); McCarty v. Cripe, 44
Am. Fed. Tax R. 978 (S.D. Ind. 1952).
94 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 239 (1948).
95 Id. at 241.
96 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 15.
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new approach could be utilized. The fact situation involved a state civil service
employee who was required, by the conditions of employment at the institution
in which he was employed, to live and eat at the institution. If the applicable
state statute, civil service rules and regulations of the state, or the individual
contract of employment considered such meals and lodging as part of the em-
ployee's compensation, then the value of these items had to be included in gross
income." The mimeograph left the inference that the Bureau's approach was not
really a new one but was a return to the position it had taken almost thirty years
earlier.98 The Bureau had evidently made the decision that the convenience of
the employer doctrine required more than a mere showing that meals or lodging
were furnished in order to allow the employee to properly perform his duties."9
Mina. 6472 indicated that whenever meals and lodging are shown by the cir-
cumstances surrounding the factual situation to serve a compensatory purpose,
even though it might be a purpose secondary to the employer's convenience, the
value of the items must be reported as income. t1
The Tax Court gave credence to the philosophy of Mim. 6472 in several
cases, one of which, Joseph L. Doran,10 was of major significance. The case
involved a maintenance man employed at a state military academy who was
required to occupy living quarters on the college grounds as a condition of his
employment. The employee received a rental allowance in addition to his base
pay, and was required by statute to pay for his lodging. He attempted to exclude
from gross income the amount he spent for lodging on the theory that he lived
at the college for the convenience of his employer. The court found for the
Commissioner and stated that:
It is undoubtedly true that the petitioner lives at his place of employment
for his employer's convenience, but it does not necessarily follow from this
that the value of his living quarters is not compensation. The weakness of
the [taxpayer's] argument is that he considers "compensation" and "con-
venience of the employer" as necessarily alternative propositions. This is
not so. The convenience of the employer rule is merely one test used to
determine whether the value of living quarters furnished to an employee is
compensation. 0
2
The district courts and courts of appeal were less receptive to Mim. 6472."'
97 Id. at 15-16.
98 See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra. The administrative pronouncements suggest-
ing a contrary conclusion were sufficiently emasculated by the following language:
Mimeograph 5023 and Mimeograph 5657 are hereby modified to the extent
they imply that the "convenience of the employer" rule is applicable to situations in
which it is otherwise evident that living quarters or meals are furnished to an em-
ployee as compensation for services rendered. Similarly, O.D. 265, O.D. 814, O.D.
915, and I.T. 2253 should not be relied upon as precedents in any case in which
living quarters or meals are determined to be compensatory without reference to the
"convenience of the employer" rule. Mim. 6472, 1950-1 Cuss. BULL. 15, 16.
99 Gutkin & Beck, supra note 41, at 155.
100 See Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, N.Y.U. 11th INST. ON FED. TAx 1147,
1148-49 (1953).
101 21 T.C. 374- (1958); accord, William H. Kenner, 30 P.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 195 (1961);
Herman J. Romer, 28 T.C. 1228 (1957); Leslie Dietz, 25 T.C. 1255 (1956); Charles A.
Brasher, 22 T.C. 637 (1954). But ef. George I. Stone, 32 T.C. 1021 (1959).
102 Joseph L. Doran, 21 T.C. 374, 376 (1953).
103 See, e.g., Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1954). See also
Powell v. White, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 68,527 (S.D. Ill. 1958).
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Gordon v. United States.. is illustrative. That case involved employees of a state
hospital who, required by the terms of their employment to live at the hospital
and to be available twenty-four hours a day, were furnished meals and lodging
by their employer. The court found that the meals and lodging were furnished
to the employees in order that they might be able to perform their duties with
greater efficiency."0 5 It noted that each of the employees received a definite
economic advantage from receipt of these items but that "[t]here is no inherent
contradiction between the existence of such economic advantage and the co-
existence of the more important convenience to the State. .. ."' Therefore,
the value of the meals and lodging furnished to the employees did not have to
be included as gross income. Without specifically rejecting Mim. 6472, the
court in Gordon evaded the philosophy behind it.
2. As a Section 119 Requirement
Mim. 6472 brought greater confusion to the already muddled convenience
of the employer doctrine. The division between the Bureau and the courts over
the various positive and negative factors to be considered in the application of
the doctrine caused Congress to attempt to clarify the controversial question of
when to exclude from income the value of meals or lodging furnished to an
employee. Congressman Reed, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee [hereinafter referred to as the "House Committee"], explained the purpose
of the House version of section 119 in the following words:
Under present law, if an employer furnishes an employee meals or lodging,
the employee may have to include their value in his income even though
they are furnished for the convenience of the employer if there is any
evidence that they are taken into account in computing the amount of the
employee's wages. The new code will remove this inequity.,
0 7
There were two proposed versions of section 119: one adopted by the
Senate, which was the version ultimately enacted by Congress, and the other
adopted by the House. The House version, as introduced by its Committee,
specified that:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value
of any meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer (whether or not
furnished as compensation) but only if-
(1) such meals or lodging are furnished at the place of employ-
ment, and
(2) the employee is required to accept such meals or lodging at
the place of employment as a condition of his employment. 08
104 152 F. Supp. 427 (D.N.J. 1957).
105 Id. at 429.
106 Id.
107 100 CONG. REC. 3423 '(1954). This thought is reiterated in the Report accompanying
the House Bill: "Your committee has adopted a provision designed to end the confusion as
to the tax status of meals and lodging furnished an employee by his employer." H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954). The same language appears in the Senate Report.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954).
108 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 119 (1954).
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It is to be noted that this version does not even speak in terms of a convenience
of the employer requirement, nor does the House Committee's Report display
any intent to have such a requirement." 9 The thought behind this omission of
the phrase "for the convenience of the employer" would seem to be that when
meals or lodging are furnished to a person at the place of employment and
required as a condition of his employment, such items are, in fact, being furnished
for the convenience of the employer. It also must be noted that the House
version clearly rejects the theory behind Mim. 6472 by specifically eliminating
the compensation factor as a reason for denying application of the convenience
of the employer doctrine. This rejection is expressed in the House Committee's
Report as well.110
The Senate Finance Committee [hereinafter referred to as the "Senate
Committee"] evidently felt that a specific convenience of the employer require-
ment was necessary and that the phrase "whether or not furnished as compensa-
tion" was confusing. In its version of the statute, which was finally enacted into
law, the latter phrase was deleted and replaced with the words "for the con-
venience of the employer.""' This change was explained in the Senate Com-
mittee's Report:
Your committee believes that the House provision is ambiguous in
providing that meals or lodging ... are excludable from income whether
or not furnished as compensation. Your committee has provided that the
basic test of exclusion is to be whether the meals or lodging are furnished
primarily for the convenience of the employer (and thus excludable) or
whether they were primarily for the convenience of the employee (and
therefore taxable).xx12
The Report continues:
Under section 119 as amended by your committee, there is excluded from
the gross income of an employee the value of meals or lodging furnished
to him for the convenience of his employer whether or not such meals or
lodging are furnished as compensation." 83
Administrative reaction to section 119 came in 1956 with the promulgation
of the first Regulations expressing the Service's interpretation of the new pro-
vision. 14 These Regulations stated that section 119 required as one of its tests
109 Under your committee's provision these meals and lodging [furnished an employee by
his employer] are to be excluded from the employee's income if they are furnished at
the place of employment and the employee is required to accept them at the place of
employment as a condition of his employment. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1954).
See also id. at A39.
110 Under section 119, if meals or lodging (1) are furnished at the place of employment,
and (2) are required to be accepted by the employee at the place of employment as
a condition of his employment, the value thereof shall be excluded from gross income,
notwithstanding the fact that such meals or lodging represent additional compensa-
tion to the employee. Id. at A39.
See also id. at 18.
111 See Amendment No. 38, 100 CoNG. REc. 9002 (1954).
112 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954).
113 Id. at 190.
114 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (1956).
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that the meals or lodging furnished to an employee be for the convenience of the
employer."' The Service gave an indication of the approach it would use to
determine whether this test had been met: "The question of whether meals are
furnished for the convenience of the employer is one of fact to be determined by
analysis of all the facts and circumstances in each case.""' 6
This pronouncement met with approval in the courts, beginning with a 1959
Tax Court decision - William P. Olkjer."' The taxpayer was an engineer em-
ployed by a construction company working in Greenland. He was supplied with
meals and lodging at the jobsite by his employer, and the employer deducted
from the taxpayer's paycheck an estimated amount to cover the cost of such
items. The taxpayer, relying on section 119, reduced his income, as reported on
his tax return, in the amount deducted by his employer for meals and lodging.
One of the issues involved in the case was concerned with the convenience of the
employer requirement of section 119. The court stated that this issue was
"primarily one of fact to be resolved by a consideration of all of the circumstances
before [the court]."" It then proceeded to review the circumstances in the
case - no other facilities for meals and lodging were available at the jobsite, the
employment agreement showed that the employer was interested in keeping
employees in proper condition to work, and the employer agreed to furnish
facilities to counteract the unusual working conditions. The court ultimately
held that the food and lodging were necessary in order to have the taxpayer
on the job, and thus were furnished for the convenience of the employer."9
Significantly, the opinion noted that section 119 does not require that the
employee be available for service twenty-four hours a day nor does it mean
that the employee cannot himself be convenienced by the receipt of such meals
and lodging. 20
In 1960 the Service explicitly recognized what it had implied in the Regula-
tions and what had become evident from Olkjer - the fact that no general rule
could be given for determining whether the convenience of the employer re-
quirement had been fulfilled. Rev. Proc. 60-6 enumerated several areas in which
the Service would not issue rulings "because of the inherently factual nature of
the problems involved.""' One of the areas listed referred to the convenience
of the employer requirement: "Whether meals and lodging furnished to an
employee are for the convenience of the employer.""'
A variety of factual patterns have appeared in the case law dealing with this
requirement. The following is a partial listing of the situations in which meals
or lodging have been determined to be furnished for the convenience of the
115 Id. § 1.119-1(a)(1), (b).116 Id. § 1. 119-1 (a) (2).
117 32 T.C. 464 (1959); accord, Manuel G. Setal, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 853 (1961).
118 32 T.C. at 468.
119 Id. at 468-69.
120 Id.
121 Rev. Proc. 60-6, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 880, superseded, Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 CuM.
BULL. 527. The latter announcement made no change with reference to section 119.
122 Rev. Proc. 60-6, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 881. But see Rev. Rul. 68-354, MERTENS, GUP-
RENT RULINGS MATESiALs, Revenue Rulings at 1090-91, a Service ruling that, where per-
sonnel at a mental hospital are needed on a twenty-four hour emergency call basis, meals and
lodging furnished such personnel are furnished for the convenience of the employer.
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employer: state troopers were given allowances for meals in order that they
could eat along their highway patrol areas and still be subject to call at a
moment's notice, so as to prevent the highways from being unguarded ;13 a
doctor's receptionist was furnished lodging at the office in order that she could
be accessible to answer business calls after hours from patients, pharmacists,
and her employer; 12 4 the president of the United States Junior Chamber of Com-
merce was furnished a house for one year at the organization's headquarters
to provide a place for conducting various meetings and social functions of the
organization at which the president would have to preside; 2 ' a caretaker at a city
park was furnished lodging at the park to enable him to watch over the area
at all times; 2 managers of a cattle ranch were given meals and lodging in order
that they could be near the cattle and available in case of emergencies arising
on the ranch;2 . and executives of a brewery were furnished homes in order to
be close to the daily operations of the brewery and available for emergency call. 2 '
The convenience of the employer requirement was found not to have been met
in other situations: a $200 per month housing allowance was given to a resident
engineer at a dam site but the engineer was unable to show to the satisfaction
of the court that the allowance was provided for the employer's benefit; 29 a
majority stockholder in a realty corporation who performed managerial duties
for two apartment buildings owned by the corporation was furnished lodging by
the corporation, but failed to prove that the lodging was for the employer's con-
venience; 3 and two employees of an undertaker were furnished houses adjacent
to the funeral home, but their duties were not found to be substantial enough
to overcome the inference that the lodging was furnished primarily for their own
benefit.'
31
The legislative history accompanying section 119 made clear that the
convenience of the employer requirement could be met regardless of the fact that
meals or lodging might be furnished as compensation.3 2 This intent was not
articulated as lucidly in the statute itself:
In determining whether meals or lodging are furnished for the convenience
of the employer, the provisions of an employment contract or of a State
statute fixing terms of employment shall not be determinative of whether
the meals or lodging are intended as compensation.
33
However, the case law has interpreted the statute, with the legislative history as
123 Keeton v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 576 (D. Colo. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 383 F.2d
429 '(10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
124 John L. Nolen, 33 P.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 654 (1964).
125 United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. C1.
1964).
126 Coyner v. Bingler, 344 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1965).
127 Wilhelm v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 16 (D. Wyo. 1966).
128 Adolph Coors Co., 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1477 (1968).
129 Henry M. Lees, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1993 (1965).
130 Nicath Realty Co., 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1411 (1966).
131 Leonard J. Ruck, Inc., P-H 1969 TAx Cr. REP. & MEx. DEc. (38 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem.) 73.
132 See text accompanying note 113 supra.
133 INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 119.
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a guideline, to effectively eliminate the compensatory element as a factor in the
convenience of the employer doctrine."'
The Regulations give the same treatment as section 119 to the effect of
lodging furnished to an employee as compensation: "If the tests [specified in
section 1.119-1 (b) ] are met, the exclusion shall apply irrespective of whether...
under an employment contract or statute fixing the terms of employment, such
lodging is furnished as compensation.""'  The Regulations are less than clear on
the effect of meals furnished as compensation in the application of the con-
venience of the employer doctrine. Section 1.119-1 (a) (2) specifies that:
If an employer furnishes meals as a means of providing additional compen-
sation to his employee (and not for a substantial noncompensatory business
reason of the employer), the meals so furnished will not be regarded as
furnished for the convenience of the employer. Conversely, if the employer
furnishes meals to his employee for a substantial noncompensatory business
reason, the meals so furnished will 'be regarded as furnished for the con-
venience of the employer, even though such meals are also furnished for a
compensatory reason. In determining the reason of an employer for furnish-
ing meals ... such determination will be based upon an examination of all
the surrounding facts and circumstances.
3 6
The proper interpretation of this language would seem to be that the phrase
"substantial noncompensatory business reason of the employer" has the same
meaning as "primarily for the convenience of the employer." In other words,
if meals are furnished to provide additional compensation and not for a sub-
stantial noncompensatory business reason, they will be considered to be furnished
primarily for the convenience of the employee and, therefore, taxable as income.
Such an interpretation would directly conform to the intentions stated in the
legislative history.' 7 The examples given in the Regulations, illustrating sub-
stantial noncompensatory business reasons, also provide evidence for this in-
ference: when meals are furnished during an employee's working hours in order
to have the employee available for emergency call during his eating period;.3 .
when meals are furnished to the employee during working hours because of a
limited meal period (thirty or forty-five minutes), where the employee could
not be expected to eat elsewhere in such a short period of time;".9 and where
meals are furnished to a restaurant or other food service employee during meal
periods in which the employee works. 40 Examples of factual patterns which
would be viewed as meals furnished for compensatory business reasons are:
generally, when meals are furnished before or after the employee's working
hours " when they are furnished on nonworking days;.42 and when meals are
134 Coyner v. Bingler, 344 F.2d 736, 738-39 (3rd Cir. 1965); United States Junior
Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d 660, 663 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Boykin v. Com-
missioner, 260 F.2d 249, 254 (8th Cir. 1958).
135 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1"(b) (1964).
136 Id. § 1.119-1(a) (2) (i).
137 See text accompanying note 112 supra.
138 Treas. Reg. § 1.119(a) (2) (ii)'(a) (1964).
139 Id. § 1.119(a) (2) (ii)'(b). See also id. § 1.119-1(a) (2) (ii) (c), (f).
140 Id. § 1.119(a) (2) (ii) (d).
141 Id. § 1.119-1(a) (2) (i). The exceptions to this general rule noted by the Regulations
are contained in section 1.119-1(a) (2) (ii) (d), (f) and deal with situations where the em-
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furnished to the employee to promote his morale, foster goodwill towards the
employer, or attract prospective employees.
143
In addition, further evidence of this interpretation has been provided by a
recent Tax Court decision and Revenue Ruling. In Carlton R. Mabley, Jr.,'"
it was held that meals furnished a corporate vice-president at daily luncheon
conferences conducted by the corporation were for substantial noncompensatory
business reasons. 4 These meals were furnished for the purpose of providing
necessary daily contact with the corporate staff, thereby conserving normal work-
ing hours which would otherwise be consumed by many daily conferences among
the various corporate executives."" In Revenue Ruling 68-354,:" ' personnel of a
mental hospital who were needed on twenty-four-hour emergency call were fur-
nished meals and lodging by their employer. The Service ruled that in light of
past emergencies and the anticipation of similar future situations, the meals and
lodging were furnished for substantial noncompensatory business reasons. 4 Thus,
even under the Regulations an exclusion under section 119 would seem to be
available, regardless of the fact that the meals or lodging are furnished as com-
pensation, if such items are furnished primarily for the convenience of the
employer.
C. Lodging Furnished an Employee as a Condition of His Employment
Section 119(2) and the Regulations specifically require that in order for
the value of lodging to be excluded from gross income, the employee must be
required to accept such lodging "as a condition of his employment."'" This is
not a new element for the convenience of the employer rule; indeed, it has
long been recognized by case law5 . and by administrative rulings'5 ' appearing
prior to section 119 as an essential element of the doctrine. In fact, the test for
determining the existence of "convenience of the employer," as given by the
Bureau in 1940, was that "if living quarters or meals are furnished to an em-
ployee who is required to accept such quarters and meals in order to perform
properly his duties," such items would be excluded from gross income.'5 2 Prior to
the enactment of section 119, there was an implicit requirement in the con-
ployee would have been furnished a meal by his employer during working hours had the
employee's duties not prevented him from eating during working hours.
142 Id. § 1.119-1 (a) (2) (i).
143 Id. § 1.119-1(a) (2) (iii).
144 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1963 "(1965).
145 Id. at 1965.
146 Id. at 1965-66.
147 MERTENS, CURRENT REVENUE RULINGS, Revenue Rulings at 1090-91.
148 Id. at 1091.
149 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b)(3) (1964).
150 See, e.g., Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955); Saunders v. Commissioner,
215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954); Moulder v. United States, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1226 (W.D.
Mo. 1955); McCarty v. Cripe, 44 Am. Fed. Tax R. 978 (S.D. Ind. 1952); Greene v. Kanne,
23 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1141 (D. Hawaii 1938); Jones v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925);
(George I. Stone, 32 T.C. 1021 '(1959); Powell v. White, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 68,527 (S.D.
III. 1958); Hazel W. Carmichael, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 239 (1948); R. Shad Bennett, 11
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1481 (1942); and Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
151 See, e.g., G.C.M. 14710, XIV-1 Cum. BULL. 44 (1935); I.T. 2253, V-1 Cum. BULL. 32
(1926); O.D. 915, 4 Cum. BULL. 85 (1921).
152 Mim. 5023, 1940-1 CuM. BULL. 14, 15.
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venience of the employer doctrine that for meals or lodging received to be
exempt from federal taxation, they had to be furnished so that the employee
could properly perform his work for the employer. Section 119 embodies this
as an explicit requirement, yet makes it only applicable to lodging received.
It has already been noted "' that the House version of section 119 expressed
two specific requirements for qualifying for the exemption: (a) that the meals
or lodging be furnished on the business premises of the employer, and (b) that
the employee be required to accept them as a condition of his employment. The
Senate Committee amended this version and expressly required (a) that such
meals be furnished for the convenience of the employer, and (b) that they be
furnished on the business premises of the employer; it also specifically required
that (a) such lodging be furnished for the convenience of the employer, (b) it
be furnished on the business premises of the employer, and (c) it be accepted
by the employee as a condition of his employment.'5" The prime reason for the
specific convenience of the employer requirement incorporated in the Senate
version was to emphasize that the keystone of the convenience of the employer
doctrine is that meals or lodging be given to an employee primarily for the
benefit and convenience of his employer. 5 No rationale for including a specific
condition of employment requirement was given in the legislative history ac-
companying the Senate's version, nor was there a reason expressed for having
the requirement apply only to lodging.
The Senate Committee Report5  and the Regulations5  explain the phrase
"required as a condition of employment" as meaning required to enable the
employee to perform properly the duties of his employment. It has already been
noted that Mim. 5023 considered this latter requirement to be the test for making
a determination of "convenience of the employer." 15 This determination entails
a consideration of all the facts and circumstances in a particular situation and
speaks to the ultimate issue of whether the meals or lodgings were furnished pri-
marily for the employer's benefit and convenience. Thus, since the "condition of
employment" concept is at the very essence of the convenience of the employer
requirement, stating it as a separate requirement of section 119 is redundant,
and unnecessary to the proper application of the statute.
Several criteria have been utilized to indicate a situation in which lodging
is furnished to an employee as a condition of his employment. The example
situation given in the Regulations is when "lodging is furnished because the em-
ployee is required to be available for duty at all times or because the employee
could not perform the services required of him unless he is furnished such lodg-
ing."'5 9 The other common criteria applied by the judiciary are evident in one
of the first tax court cases to have discussed this section 119 requirement -
Mary B. Heyward.' The court cited several instances in which an employee
153 See text accompanying note 108 supra.
154 See Amendment No. 38, 100 CONG. REC. 9002 (1954).
155 See text accompanying note 112 supra.
156 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 190 (1954).
157 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (1964).
158 See text accompanying note 152 supra.
159 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (1964).
160 36 T.C. 739 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 301 F.2d 307 '(4th Cir. 1962).
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would have to accept lodging from his employer in order to properly perform
his duties - the remoteness of the jobsite and the unavailability of other facilities
in the area, the inherent necessity of the employee's presence at the jobsite, or
demands made by the employer for his own reasons." 1 Thus, the exigencies of
the particular situation may as a practical matter require the employee to accept
the lodging furnished by his employer; there is no need for an express require-
ment by the employer'0 2
More recent case law might well have eliminated one of the criteria - "at
the demand of the employer" - listed in Heyward. Gordon S. Dole63 involved
employees of a clothing mill who were required by their employer to live in
company-owned houses approximately one mile from the mill. Relying on the
legislative history and the Regulations, the court stated that the condition of
employment standard "prescribed by Congress is not subjective. It is objective.
The employer's state of mind is not controlling.' 0x 4 Then, using the objective
test of whether the lodging was "required in order for the employee to properly
perform the duties of his employment," the court denied the section 119 ex-
emption.
0 5
As a practical matter, the method and ultimate test utilized in making a
determination of whether the condition of employment requirement has been
met is identical to that used for establishing the convenience of the employer
requirement. It calls for an analysis of all the facts and circumstances in each
case. 66 In the Olkjer case it was the decision of the court that meals and lodging
had been furnished employees for the convenience of the employer because such
an arrangement was necessary in order to have the employees working at the job-
site.'67 The factual situations in other cases found to meet the convenience of
the employer requirement also give the indication that one of the requisites is
that the meals or lodging to be furnished to the employee because his duties
require that he eat or live at the situs of his employment. 6 Thus, one is hard
pressed to find a true distinction between the two requirements. United States
Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States'69 is in accord with this position.
The court was presented with a section 119 situation and stated that "[t]here
does not appear to be any substantial difference between the first two conditions
of § 119: The 'convenience of the employer' test and the 'required as a condi-
tion of his employment' test."' 70 The two requirements were discussed together
in Nicath Realty Company' as well. There the court expressly used the con-
dition of employment requirement (that lodging is required in order to enable the
employee to perform properly the duties of his employment) to determine whether
161 Id. at 744.
162 See Manuel G. Setal, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 853, 856 (1961). See also Coyner v.
Bingler, 344 F.2d 736, 738 (3d Cir. 1965).
163 43 T.C. 697, aff'd per curiam, 351 F.2d 308, (1st Cir. 1965).
164 Id. at 706.
165 Id.
166 See text accompanying notes 116-18 supra.
167 See text accompanying note 119 supra.
168 See, e.g., John L. Nolen, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 654, 656 (1964).
169 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. C1. 1964).
170 Id. at 663.
171 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1411 (1966).
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the lodging provided had met the requirement of being furnished for the con-
venience of the employer.' While the other cases dealing with section 119 (2)
are more subtle, the result has been the same. The courts have attempted to
distinguish the two requirements but have, in effect, treated them identically.
The practical conclusion to this discussion is that the condition of employ-
ment requirement of section 119 is an anomaly, both because of its inconsistent
application to lodging, and not meals, and because it is actually a factor to be
considered in satisfying the convenience of the employer requirement.
D. Furnished Without Charge
The first Regulations promulgated after the enactment of section 119
specified:
The exclusion provided by section 119 applies only to meals and lodging
furnished in kind, without charge or cost to the employee. If the employee
has an option to receive additional compensation in lieu of meals or lodging
in kind, or is required to reimburse the employer for meals or lodging
furnished in kind, the value of such meals and lodging is not excluded
from gross income. 7 3
This statement expresses the "free of charge" requirement. In more concrete
terms, this requirement means that if an employee is furnished meals and lodging
by his employer, but is required to pay for such items, he is not allowed to reduce
his reported gross income by the amount paid for the meals or lodging, or by
the reasonable value thereof.
The legislative history of section 119 is silent on this particular requirement,
but there is evidence of its existence in case law prior to the passage of section
119.'11 It would appear from the cases that the free of charge requirement
is founded on two principles: (a) when an employee receives any cash
payment for services performed, he has received compensation that must be
reported as gross income on his income tax return, regardless of the fact that
the employee uses the money to pay his employer for meals or lodging which
he is required to accept in order to perform his employment duties;" 5 and (b)
the word "furnished" in the statutory phrase "furnished for the convenience of
the employer," implies that meals or lodging are to be given to the employee
free of charge. "
The first of these two principles is not new to the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine. The idea that the doctrine did not apply when meals or lodging
were furnished for compensatory reasons was dramatized by Mim. 6472.' Yet
this has been overcome by the enactment of section 119, which, in effect, elim-
172 Id. at 1416-17.
173 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c) (2) (1956).
174 E.g., Herman Martin, 44 B.T.A. 185 (1941); accord, Robert Douglas Bartilson, 23 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1023 (1954); Joseph L. Doran, 21 T.C. 374 (1953); Hazel W. Carmichael, 17
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 239 (1948). Contra, Powell v. White, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 68,527 (S.D.
Ill. 1958) (semble). But cf. Lloyd N. Farnham, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 898 (1947).
175 See Herman Martin, 44 B.T.A. 185, 189 (1941).
176 See Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249, 251-52 (8th Cir. 1958).
177 See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
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inates the compensatory element as a determining factor in the convenience of
the employer doctrine. Thus, it can readily be seen that the convenience of the
employer doctrine should apply regardless of the fact that the employee is re-
quired to pay for his meals or lodging. There is no substantial difference be-
tween paying an employee $1300 per month and requiring him to reimburse the
employer for meals and lodging in the amount of $300 per month, and paying
an employee $1000 per month and furnishing him meals and lodging free of
charge. An analysis of the applicability of the convenience of the employer
doctrine should yield similar results in both situations. If section 119 recognizes
an exclusion of $300 for the value of meals or lodging furnished an employee,
so also should the statute apply to the $300 paid for meals or lodging where such
items are not furnished free of charge. Neither the legislative history, the case
law dealing with the free of charge requirement, nor the Regulations promulgat-
ing such requirement give any indication that, if an employee is charged for his
meals or lodging, such items still cannot be furnished primarily for the con-
venience of the employer. The fact that the Regulations implied such a require-
ment from section 119 would seem to stem from the absence of clear language
in the statute negating the compensatory element."'
Wisely, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the free of
charge requirement in 1958 in the case of Boykin v. Commissionern. The factual
situation involved an employee-physician who was required to live at a hospital
in order to properly perform his duties. The employee was given a salary from
which a set amount was deducted for the fair rental value of the lodging fur-
nished to him by his employer. The court attacked the free of charge require-
ment by concentrating on the meaning of the word "furnished" as used in the
context of the convenience of employer doctrine. It was held that "furnished"
did not carry with it the implication of "free of charge""8 and that nothing in
section 119 itself or the legislative history indicated that the exclusion was limited
to meals and lodgings furnished on a gratuitous basis.'8" Finally, the opinion
analyzed the requirement according to the basic test for the doctrine - pri-
marily for the convenience of the employer.8 2 The immediate holding was in
favor of the taxpayer, allowing him to exclude the fair rental value of the lodging
from his gross income;8 3 the implicit conclusion was that the Regulations had
misinterpreted the statute.
In 1959 the Service issued Revenue Ruling 59-307 announcing that it would
follow the Boykin decision. "4 Later in the same year, the Tax Court in Olkjer'
5
and the Fourth Circuit in Wolf v. Commissioner88 added their approval of the
Boykin rationale. Yet it was not until 1964 that the Regulations were amended
178 See text accompanying note 133 supra.
179 260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958).
180 Id. at 251.
181 Id. at 252.
182 Id. at 254.
183 Id.
184 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 48.
185 William I. Olkjer, 32 T.C. 464, 468 (1959).
186 59-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 73,378 (4th Cir. 1959), rev'g and remanding per stipulation, 27
P-H Tax Ct. 580 '(1958).
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to reflect any change with regard to the free of charge requirement.8 7 In the
subsection pertaining to lodging, the present Regulations state that as long as
the other requirements for section 119 are fulfilled,
[i]f the employer furnishes the employee lodging for which the employee is
charged an unvarying amount irrespective of whether he accepts the lodging,
the amount of the charge made by the employer for such lodging is not, as
such, part of the compensation includible in the gross income of the
employee .... I"
The Regulations continue to discuss "meals furnished without a charge" sep-
arately from "meals furnished with a charge" ;159 however, the distinction made
between the two would seem to be insignificant. Where meals are furnished to
the employee for a charge the Regulations provide that the charges made for
such meals are not to be included in gross income (presuming the other require-
ments for such an exclusion have been met) if: (a) the employee has no choice
but to purchase his meals from the employer; and (b) the charge is an unvarying
amount. 9 The effect of the language denying an exclusion for charged meals,
where the employee is provided with the option of either accepting such meals
and paying for them, or not paying for them and providing his own meals, is to
reiterate the basic principle of section 119 and the convenience of the employer
doctrine: such meals must be furnished primarily for the benefit and convenience
of the employer. If the employee has the option of providing his own meals, the
meals evidently need not be furnished by the employer in order for the employee
to properly render service to the employer. In addition, there would seem to
be no reason to limit the exclusion to meals and lodging for which an unvarying
charge is made, e.g., by subtraction from the employee's stated compensation.
The fact that the charge may vary should not be a factor. Hopefully, the courts
will disregard these ambiguous qualifications and consider both charged and
uncharged meals and lodging according to the basic convenience of the employer
requirement.
E. Meals or Lodging Must Be Furnished in Kind
Section 119 does not contain an explicit requirement that meals or lodging
187 T.D. 6745, 29 Fed. Reg. 9380 (1964).
188 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (1964).
189 Compare id. § 1.119-1(a) (2) with id. § 1.119-1(a)(3).
190 The Regulation reads:
(3) Meals furnished with a charge.
(i) If an employer provides meals which an employee may or may not purchase, the
meals will not be regarded as furnished for the convenience of the employer. Thus,
meals for which a charge is made by the employer will not be regarded as furnished
for the conveniece of the employer if the employee has a choice of accepting the
meals and paying for them or of not paying for them and providing his meals in
another manner.
(ii) If an employer furnishes an employee meals for which the employee is charged
an unvarying amount '(for example, by subtraction from his stated compensation)
irrespective of whether he accepts the meals, the amount of such flat charge made by
the employer for such meals is not, as such, part of the compensation includible in
the gross income of the employee .... In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the value of the meals may be deemed to be equal to the amount charged for them.
Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a) (3) (i), (ii). See generally Rev. Rul. 67-259, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 76.
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be furnished in kind; however, the "in kind" requirement is expressly stated in
the Regulations:
The exclusion provided by section 119 applies only to meals and lodging
furnished in kind by an employer to his employee. Cash allowances for
meals or lodging received by an employee are includible in gross income to
the extent that such allowances constitute compensation. 1
Evidently, the Service has implied this requirement from the section 119 words
"value of any meals or lodging furnished to [the employee] .... " The pre-Code
cases in the area 9 2 and the legislative history behind section 119's' lend support
to the Service's interpretation. The following statement taken from both the
House Committee Report and the Senate Committee Report indicates congres-
sional intention to make an in kind requirement implicit within the statutory
language of section 119: "[this section] applies only to meals or lodging fur-
nished in kind. Therefore, any cash allowances for meals or lodging received
by an employee will continue to be includible in gross income.., to the extent
that such allowances represent compensation."'9 4
The case law9 s and administrative rulings issued 9 6 subsequent to the pas-
sage of the Code have, in general, recognized the in kind requirement as one
of the essential elements for an exclusion under section 119. However, the re-
quirement has not been accorded universal acceptance.' The case law dealing
with state police subsistence allowances has been the maverick of the convenience
of the employer doctrine, and particularly so with reference to the in kind re-
quirement of the doctrine.
In its early years, the convenience of the employer doctrine was applied
to a number of situations dealing with subsistence and/or quarters allowance.
Jones v. United States is a notable example.9 However, by and large, the
employment situations where these allowances were provided and excluded as
income involved military or foreign service personnel, who, through rulings and
regulations, gradually came to be treated separately from the convenience of
the employer doctrine. A distinction between military personnel and civilian
191 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c)(2) '(1964).
192 See, e.g., Magness v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 931 (1958) ; Sweeney v. United States, 285 F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ; Charles H. Hyslope,
21 T.C. 131 (1953); and Gunnar Van Rosen, 17 T.C. 834' (1951). But cf. Saunders v. Com-
missioner, 215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
193 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A39 (1954); S. REP'. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 190-91 (1954).
194 Id.
195 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 200 (D.N.H. 1968); Michael A.
Tougher, Jr., P-H 1969 TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. (51 T.C. -) 519; Charles N. Anderson,
42 T.C. 410, rev'd on other grounds, 371 F.2d 59 "(6th Cir. 1966); and Henry M. Lees, 34
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1993 (1965).
196 See T.I.R. 741, MERTENS, 1961-1965 RULINGS, Miscellaneous Announcements at 378-
79 (1965); Rev. Rul. 60-66, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 21.
197 See United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barrett,
321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963); and Keeton v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 576 (D. Colo.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967).
198 In Jones, the Court of Claims held that a military officer had not realized taxable
income in the form of cash allowances provided for quarters. For further discussion of this case




employees for purposes of the exclusion was made in Gunnar Van Rosen. 9
A civilian employee of the Army Transportation Corps, as a result of the duties
of his employment, was required to eat some of his meals away from home. The
employee was given a cash allowance by his employer to pay for these meals.
Although the allowance was given for the convenience of the employer, the Tax
Court distinguished the situation in Jones from the facts in Van Rosen because
the former involved "an army officer and ... the terms and conditions of his
service were much more rigid and his freedom of action much more restricted
than in the case of a civilian employee .... " 200 The court decided that the
convenience of the employer doctrine required that meals be furnished in kind
and, the cash allowances granted to the civilian employee could therefore not
be excluded from gross income.2 1
The first case concerned with the tax consequences of state police sub-
sistence allowances was Charles H. Hyslope. °2 An Indiana state trooper, while
on duty, was required by his employer to purchase his meals near his highway
assignment. To reimburse him for the cost of these meals and other incidental
expenses, the state gave the trooper a $70 per month subsistence allowance. Re-
lying on Van Rosen as precedent, and distinguishing the state police subsistence
allowance situation from Jones, the Tax Court held that these allowances were
taxable income to those employees receiving them.
0 3
The "Van Rosen-Hyslope approach" met with opposition in a court of ap-
peals decision-Saunders v. Commissioner."' Saunders was a state trooper who
had enlisted in a two-year program with the New Jersey State Police. The program
was structured along military lines whereby each trooper lived at the state police
station, was on call for duty twenty-four hours a day, and could not leave his
post without permission. Originally the program required each trooper to return
to his station for all of his meals. However, in an effort to keep the troopers close
to their highway assignments, a new system was initiated whereby they were
given a cash allowance in lieu of meals. The Van Rosen-Hyslope approach was
distinguished in that Saunders was in a program analagous to the usual military
situation. The rigidity and discipline found in the New Jersey State Police pro-
gram left no doubt that the allowance for meals was furnished primarily for
the benefit and convenience of the employer. Relying on Jones as precedent, the
court held that the convenience of the employer doctrine was applicable and
that such cash allowances need not be included within gross income. 5
The Hyslope rationale was followed in a court of appeals case coming
after enactment of the Code but dealing with a tax year prior to the Code.
Magness v. Commissioner"'0 involved a state trooper who was required to eat
some of his meals near the highway while on duty, but was not subject to the
strict working conditions present in Saunders. The troopers were also given a
199 17 T.C. 834'(1951).
200 Id. at 839.
201 Id. at 839-40.
202 21 T.C. 131 (1953).
203 Id. at 133-34.
204 215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
205 Id. at 773-75.
206 247 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 931 (1958).
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flat allowance of $4.50 per day in lieu of meals, regardless of their actual ex-
penses and whether they were on duty or on vacation. Refusing to rely on
Saunders, the Fifth Circuit held that the meals were not furnished in kind and
therefore could not be excluded under the convenience of the employer doctrine.
20 7
The special treatment sometimes afforded state troopers over other non-
military employees was given statutory recognition in section 120 of the Code:
(a) General Rule. - Gross income does not include any amount
received as a statutory subsistence allowance by an individual who is
employed as a police official by a State ....
(b) Limitations. -
(1) Amounts to which subsection (a) applies shall not exceed $5 per
day.208
The legislative history reflects the congressional intent to provide state police
officers an exclusion not ordinarily allowed, because these officers were required
to make frequent trips away from their command posts.2"9 It would also seem to
be another example of a type of "per se" convenience of the employer doctrine,
analogous to the exclusions granted for allowances provided to military and
other special government personnel. 10 However, four years later, section 120
was repealed 1' as a result of abuses by state authorities who utilized the ex-
emption for compensatory purposes rather than for the state's convenience.1 2
In addition, congressional sentiment for the state police and their peculiar situa-
tion declined: "this exclusion is inequitable since there are many other individual
taxpayers whose duties also require them to incur subsistence expenditures re-
gardless of the tax effect."2 It was the intent of Congress "[t]o bring the tax
treatment of subsistence allowances for police officials in line with the treatment
of such allowances in the case of other taxpayers .... "1214
Despite the repeal of section 120, the court of appeals cases which dealt
with taxable years after the passage of the Code continued to cite Saunders as
authority for granting exclusions for state police subsistences allowances. Two
of these cases were United States v. Barrett.5 and United States v. Morelan."'
They involved cash allowances granted to state troopers who were required to
eat their meals at restaurants close to their highway assignments, to inform their
superiors of when and where they would be eating their meals, and to remain
on duty during their meal periods in the event that they were needed. At the
end of each pay period, the trooper was required to submit an expense account
and was allowed a subsistence reimbursement up to a maximum amount. The
factual situation of these two cases was distinguished from the circumstances pres-
207 Id. at 744-45.
208 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 120, 68A Stat. 39 (repealed 1958).
209 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1954).
210 See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
211 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 3, 72 Stat. 1607.
212 See H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1957); S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1958).
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
216 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
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ent in Hyslope and Magness on two counts: (a) Barrett and Morelan dealt
with situations where greater restrictions were imposed on the troopers' meal
periods and greater concern shown for the benefit and convenience of the state
in providing the allowances;2 17 and (b) they illustrated a definite correlation
between the amount of reimbursement and the sum actually expended for meals,
whereas, there was no correlation found between the reimbursement and expendi-
tures in Hyslope and Magness.2"'
There was an additional argument posed in Morelan. The Commissioner
argued that the Regulations and legislative history clearly indicated that section
119 contained an implied in kind requirement. Addressing itself to the language
contained in the Regulations and legislative history the court held that:
The phrase [cash allowances for meals or lodging received by an employee
are includible in gross income] "to the extent that such allowances represent
compensation" could easily modify the words "cash allowances," meaning
that only cash allowances which "compensate" - i.e., reward or benefit
rather than reimburse - are includable in gross income. In the instant
cases [Saunders, Barrett and Morelan] the evidence abundantly supports a
conclusion that in fact the subsistence allowance was not compensation.21 9
The most recent case to follow the Saunders line of cases was Keeton v.
United States.2 The factual pattern was the same with one notable exception.
Rather than require the troopers to list their actual expenses and receive reim-
bursements up to a maximum amount, the troopers in Keeton received a set
$50 per month allowance for meals and uniform maintenance. This arrange-
ment was the same utilized in Hyslope and Magness, except that the amount
provided the troopers was shown not to be sufficient to cover the actual cost
of expenses. The court made a special effort to emphasize that the reason for
this practice of providing cash allowances in lieu of meals was actually founded
in sound business policy, i.e., to eliminate costly bookkeeping. 221 The fact that
the allowance did not meet the actual expenses incurred by the troopers enabled
the court to dismiss any argument that the allowance was granted for com-
pensatory reasons, and decide that it was in fact given for the convenience of
the state in providing better police service. Thus, the cash allowance was ex-
cluded from gross income.222
Unquestionably, the in kind requirement appears to be as artificial
and formalistic as the free of charge requirement. There can be no sub-
stantial difference between having a state trooper return to his station to
eat the meals provided there, where he will remain available for immediate call
to service, and allowing him to eat at a restaurant near his highway assignment,
where he will also remain on duty and be subject to call at any time. Ironically,
the truth is that requiring the trooper to eat closer to his highway assignment
217 United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Morelan, 356 F.2d 199, 207 (8th Cir. 1966).
218 Id.
219 United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199, 204 (8th Cir. 1966).
220 256 F. Supp. 576 (D. Colo. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967).




renders a greater benefit and convenience to the state. As Saunders indicated,
the system of requiring the troopers to eat along the patrolled highways makes it
possible for the state police to provide better protection to motorists. Thus, since
the prime criterion of section 119 is convenience to the employer, there seems to
be greater justification in allowing an exemption for subsistence allowances than
for meals furnished directly to troopers by the state. It would seem that any
possible abuse brought about by allowing exclusions for cash allowances could
be controlled by a proper finding that the item is provided primarily for the
convenience of the employer.2 23
While the in kind requirement would seem to have no practical place in
the convenience of the employer doctrine, the fact remains that the requirement
is indeed implicitly contained within section 119 and explicitly stated in the
Regulations. A recent district court case, Wilson v. United States,..4 bases its
holding on this observation. Despite the fact that the case involved a situation
v'hich strongly resembled that appearing in the trooper cases allowing the ex-
elusion, Wilson upheld the in kind requirement for section 119 in denying an
exclusion of subsistence allowances given to New Hampshire state troopers.2 5
The opinion directs itself to the real problem in the judicial debate over the
in kind requirement - the language contained in the Regulations and the statute.
The Regulations have interpreted section 119 as addressing itself only to
meals and lodging furnished in kind, and unless this is an unreasonable and
inconsistent interpretation, then it must be given judicial recognition.22
Considering the language of the statute and the legislative history, this in-
terpretation would seem to be beyond reproach. Section 119 specifies that "the
value of any meals or lodging furnished" will be excluded from gross income.
The court in Wilson validly recognized that it would be a torture of words to
interpret "value of" as equivalent to "cost of,"22 7 in addition, it would seem
improper to interpret "furnished" as meaning "reimbursed in cash." The strong
implication of an in kind requirement in this language is supported by the
specific statements in the legislative history that section 119 will apply only to
meals or lodging furnished in kind. 22 ' Had Congress really desired to include
cash allowances within section 119, it would likely have specifically provided
for the exclusion as it did with the exclusion granted to ministers in section 107.229
223 The real objection to treating subsistence allowances the same as meals and lodging
furnished in kind seems to be that when an employer furnishes meals and lodging to an em-
ployee, the employer maintains control over such items and they are furnished in order to
provide the employee with food and a place to live; when the employer gives an employee a
subsistence allowance, to the extent that the money is the employee's own and without restric-
tions on its use or expenditure, the employer loses control of the allowance, and the money
might be spent on items other than meals or lodging. See Gunnar Van Rosen, 17 T.C. at
836. However, even in situations where a flat cash allowance is given to the employee, it still
must be shown that the allowance is given primarily for the convenience of the employer. If
the allowance system is abused, i.e., the allowance is given more for the employee's benefit and
convenience, the convenience of the employer requirement will not be met and section 119 will
not apply.
224 292 F. Supp. 195 (D.N.H. 1968).
225 Id. at 205-06.
226 See id. at 205.
227 Id.
228 See text accompanying note 194 supra.
229 See INT. REV. CoDn. of 1954, § 107.
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Additionally, had Congress wanted to provide for an exemption to state troopers
receiving subsistence allowances, section 120 would not have been repealed. Even
the argument advanced in Morelan that the words "to the extent that such al-
lowances constitute compensation," stated in the Regulations and legislative
history, indicate that the in kind requirement applies only if the allowances are
given as compensation, runs counter to a basic premise of section 119. This
premise, also stated in the Regulations and legislative history, is that the statutory
exclusion will apply regardless of any compensatory intent accompanying the
meals or lodging, so long as the benefits are primarily given for the employer's
convenience."O On the basis of this premise, the fact that a subsistence allowance
constitutes compensation is itself irrelevant to an appropriate consideration of
section 119.231 Thus, it appears the existence of the in kind requirement cannot
be justifiably denied until an amendment to the statute and/or an amendment
to the Regulation is made.
F. Furnished on the Business Premises of the Employer
Section 119 and the Regulations232 specifically require that meals or lodging
be furnished on the business premises of the employer in order for the statutory
exclusion to apply. The problem here can be stated very simply: What does
the phrase "on the business premises of the employer" mean? The legislative
history232 and the Regulations" 4 define "business premises" as, in general, the
place of employment of the employee. The problem with this definition is in
determining the precise meaning of "the place of employment." The Regula-
tions, in an attempt to express these abstract phrases in concrete terms, give two
examples of situations which fulfill the business premises requirement:
[Mfeals and lodging furnished in the employer's home to a domestic servant
would constitute meals and lodging furnished on the business premises of the
employer. Similarly, meals furnished to cowhands while herding their
employer's cattle on leased land would be regarded as furnished on the
business premises of the employer.
235
These examples merely state the obvious and literal meaning of the phrase "on
the business premises of the employer." The courts actually are left without a
definite guideline to follow in this area.
The cases dealing with the business premises requirement reflect this lack
of congressional and administrative direction. The opinions appear to be groping
aimlessly for want of an established test by which a judgment on this require-
230 See text accompanying notes 132-37 supra.
231 One explanation for this language might be that it is included within the Regulations
and legislative history to point out that cash allowances will be included in gross income unless
some other provision of the Code or Regulations provides that such allowances do not consti-
tute compensation. See, e.g., the exclusions from gross income specified in INT. REv. CODE of
1954, §§ 101-18; the statutory exclusion provided in id. § 912 for government foreign service
personnel; and the exclusion for allowances given to other government personnel provided in
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b) (1957).
232 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.119-1(a)'(1) (i), (b) (1) (1964).
233 Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1954).
234 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c) (1) (1964).
235 Id.
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ment can be made. In 1963 the first case which devoted discussion to the mean-
ing of "on the business premises" appeared, it was one of the earlier discussed
state trooper cases - United States v. Barrett."" The court found that a private
restaurant could be considered the business premises of the state police because
the duties of a state trooper entailed protecting all the highways in the state
and not merely the station headquarters."' The idea that "the business premises
of the employer" means the place where the employee performs his duties was
explicitly stated in United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United
States."' The president of the National Junior Chamber of Commerce occupied
a special house owned by the organization and furnished to each new president.
Although it was used as a family residence, the house served as the place where
the president performed many of his official duties, as the site of meetings and
other events conducted by the organization. In finding that the business premises
requirement had been met, the court stated the following test: "We think that
the business premises of § 119 means premises of the employer on which
the duties of the employee are to be performed."2 9
A somewhat stricter interpretation of business premises was given by the
Tax Court in the 1965 case of Gordon S. Dole:4 "We think the phrase should
be construed to mean either (1) living quarters that constitute an integral part
of the business property or (2) premises on which the company carries on some
of its business activities." 24  Dole involved an employee who was furnished
housing one mile from the mill where he was employed, in order that he would
be available for twenty-four hour call. The court's "'doubt whether Congress ever
intended section 119 to apply to situations.., where the employee does his work
in one location and resides at another location some distance away" led it to
conclude that this requirement had not been fulfilled.242 The First Circuit
affined the decision in a per curiam opinion2 43 on the basis of the Tax Court's
concurring opinion, which was even more restrictive:
The statute does not say "at some convenient or reasonably accessible"
place; it does not say "in a nearby building" owned by the employer. It
says "on the business premises" of the employer. These words mean what
they say and should not be given any strained or eccentric interpretation
so as to frustrate what the Legislature obviously tried to achieve2 44
One year later, the Eighth Circuit, in Morelan v. United States,245 seemed to
reach an opposite conclusion. Morelan held that a restaurant near or adjacent
to a highway was "on the business premises of the employer" in situations in-
236 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
237 Id. at 912.
238 334 F.2d 660 '(Ct. Cl. 1964).
239 Id. at 664-65.
240 43 T.C. 697, aff'd per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965). See Henry M. Lees, 34
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1993, 1997 (1965); Carlton R. Mabley, Jr., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1963,
1966 (1965).
241 43 T.C. at 707.
242 Id.
243 Dole v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965).
244 Dole v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 697, 708 (1965) (concurring opinion).
245 356 F.2d 199 '(8th Cir. 1966). See Keeton v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 576 (D. Colo.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 44:1104] NOTES 1135
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
volving state troopers.24 The conclusion was a result of a two-pronged rationale:
(a) Congress did not put geographical bounds on the business premises of an
employer, and (b) all the land within the state could be said to be the business
premises of the state police.247
These cases set the stage for Commissioner v. Anderson, 4' a decision from
the Sixth Circuit which gave exhaustive treatment to the business premises re-
quirement in the hope of settling the judicial dispute over this element of the
convenience of the employer doctrine. The taxpayer was a motel manager whose
duties at the motel required him to be available for service at any time of the
day or night. The employer initially required the manager and his family to
occupy one of the units in the motel; however, the conditions became crowded
and unsatisfactory and the employer built a house two blocks from the motel to
serve as a residence for the manager. Initially, the Tax Court interpreted the
Regulations as recognizing that under certain circumstances the place of em-
ployment might be separated from the living quarters.24" It stated that "to con-
clude that property owned by an employer within two short blocks of a facility
being managed by an employee . .. is not on the business premises of the em-
ployer within the meaning of section 119 . . . is too restrictive an interpre-
tation.""2 5
The Sixth Circuit reversed and interpreted the phrase "on the business
premises of the employer" to mean
that in order for the value of meals or lodging to be excluded from gross
income, the meals must be furnished or the lodging be provided either at a
place where the employee performs a significant portion of his duties or on
the premises where the employer conducts a significant portion of his busi-
ness.
25"
The fact that the manager was on call for service twenty-four hours a day was
found not of itself to form a basis for a finding of "on the business premises of
the employer.""' Additionally, the court rejected the contention that if meals
or lodging were provided on premises owned by the employer for the purpose
of being a benefit and convenience to the employer, the items need not be fur-
nished where the employee performs his duties or where the employer conducts
his business:
To make ownership by the employer from business motives the test of a
"business premises" is to fail to provide for instances of meals furnished or
lodging provided on non-owned premises, contrary to the expressed Con-
gressional intent, while at the same time opening wide a tax loophole con-
trary to any expressed Congressional intent."'
246 356 F.2d at 203.
247 Id.
248 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966).
249 Charles N. Anderson, 42 T.C. 410, 416 (1964). See generally George I. Stone. 32 T.C.
1021 (1959); William I. Olkier, 32 T.C. 464 (1959).
250 42 T.C. at 417.




Finally, the court refuted the idea that the business premises requirement could
be fulfilled even though the employee was not receiving his meals or lodging
directly on the business premises of the employer: "Had Congress so intended,
it would appear that it could readily have used the words 'in the vicinity of' or
'nearby' or 'close-to' or 'contiguous to' or similar language, rather than to say
on the business premises." '254
The decision was not without a vigorous dissenting opinion which relied
primarily on Barrett and Morelan in coming to the conclusion that the majority's
interpretation of "on the business premises of the employere was "an obsession
with words.., narrow and extreme, and is unjustified by the purposes of the
statute and contrary to the intention of Congress." 2 5 This conclusion was also
based on the legislative history behind section 119. According to the dissent,
Congress indicated that the basic test of an exemption under the Code was
whether the meals or lodging were furnished primarily for the convenience of the
employer."' The majority decision had the effect of obviating this basic test
by not interpreting the phrase "on the business premises of the employer" in
light of the meaning of the convenience of the employer requirement. In addi-
tion, the dissent stated that even on the basis of the restrictive test announced
in the majority opinion, the motel manager had fulfilled the requirement. Since
he was subject to call at all times and did receive guests' complaints, questions,
and requests at the house, he was, in fact, performing some of his managerial
duties at the house.5 7
The business premises requirement is another example of a test superfluous
to the primary meaning behind section 119. The requirement is based upon
geographical integration rather than "convenience of the employer." If an
employee is furnished lodging on the same property where he works, then he
fulfills the business premises requirement, regardless of how distant the lodging
is from his jobsite. Yet if the employee is furnished lodging on certain property
and works on certain other property, then he fails to fulfill the requirement,
regardless of the proximity of his lodging to his jobsite. Thus, a motel manager
who is furnished a house across the street from the motel, but who performs no
duties there, is held not to meet the business premises requirement; yet, a man-
ager who is furnished a unit in the motel two blocks from the motel office meets
the requirement, even though he performs none of his duties in his lodging unit.
The emphasis on geography rather than convenience of the employer clearly
seems to be without logic.
IV. Conclusion
It is ironic that the Report accompanying the Senate's amended version of
section 119 explained that provision as "designed to end the confusion as to the
254 Id. There is evidence that even the state trooper cases may be yielding to the stricter
interpretation of "business premises." In Wilson v. United States, the Dole concurring opinion
was cited again for the proposition that "on" indeed means "on." 262 F. Supp. 200, 206
'(D.N.H. 1968).
255 371 F.2d at 77.
256 See id. at 69-71.
257 Id. at 76-77.
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tax status of meals and lodging furnished an employee by his employer."25 It
must be granted that Mim. 6472 precipitated the need for a statutory provision;
however, it seems that section 119 has failed to calm the maelstrom that has
characterized the convenience of the employer doctrine for many years. In addi-
tion, the Regulations interpreting the statute have tainted the doctrine with
ambiguities and meaningless distinctions. This situation has brought about
judicial and administrative inconsistency within the area of law governed by
section 119 and has placed the taxpayer and practitioner, contemplating the
possibility of an exemption under that section, in a state of bewilderment. Only
an amendment to the statute and a complete revision of the Regulations govern-
ing section 119 will dissipate the ills that surround the doctrine.
Throughout the preceding examination of the convenience of the employer
doctrine, the basic test for determining whether the doctrine would be applicable
in a given situation has repeatedly been referred to as whether the meals or
lodging, or cash allowances in lieu thereof, are furnished primarily for the benefit
or convenience of the employer. If such is proven to be the case, the doctrine
will be held to apply. Thus, for any requirement to be at all relevant to a de-
termination of the application of the doctrine, it must indicate that the meals
or lodging, or cash allowances in lieu thereof, are given more for the convenience
of the employer than the employee.
The convenience of the employer doctrine by nature involves an employer-
employee relationship. To hold otherwise would be a contradiction in terms.
The "entity theory" of taxation, as applied to the partnership-partner or corpo-
ration-stockholder situation, recognizes the possibility of a partner or a stock-
holder being in an employer-employee relationship with his partnership or corpo-
ration. Thus, the requirement is reduced to a determination of whether the tax-
payer is in fact an employee. This will involve a consideration of all the facts
and circumstances in each particular case.
It has been noted that there is nothing inherent within the present free of
charge and in kind requirements which precludes the conclusion that meals or
lodging, or cash allwances in lieu thereof, are furnished primarily for the em-
ployer's benefit. Rather, these two factors should be viewed only as circumstances
to be considered in making the final determination for whose convenience such
items are furnished. No strict requirement should be made whereby meals or
lodging must be furnished free of charge or in kind because there are situations
where one or both of these requirements are absent and the criterion "primarily
for the benefit or convenience of the employer" can still be shown. This was
recognized in the case of military and foreign service personnel long ago. There
is no reason why these groups should be afforded special tax treatment over any
other group of employees whose employment duties necessitate that they remain
on duty during their eating or resting periods, and whose employers find it more
convenient to charge for the meals or lodging or give cash allowances in lieu of
such items.
The phrase "on the business premises" has been given various interpreta-
tions, with the most recent case, Commissioner v. Anderson, stating that it is
258 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954).
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"a place where the employee performs a significant portion of his duties or on
the premises where the employer conducts a significant portion of his business."" 9
The latter part of this definition places the emphasis of the requirement on
geography rather than on whether the meals or lodging are furnished for the
employer's convenience. The other part of the Anderson definition corresponds
directly to the condition of employment requirement: If the employee is fur-
nished meals or lodging at a place where he performs a significant portion of
his duties, it follows that he is given such items in order to enable him to perform
properly the duties of his employment. But this latter element is inherent within
the convenience of the employer requirement as well. The business premises,
and condition of employment requirements are thereby reduced to one inter-
meshed convenience of the employer requirement, which must consider all the
facts and circumstances in a particular case.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis would seem to be that there
is only one actual requirement - the "convenience of the employer" test. The
convenience of the employer doctrine cannot be delineated into separate require-
ments because all of these "requirements" apply as their ultimate test all the facts
and circumstances which lead to a determination that the meals or lodging,
or cash allowances in lieu thereof, are furnished primarily for the benefit or
convenience of the employer. Even the compensatory nature of the items fur-
nished an employee, while not being a requirement as specified by Mim. 6472,
should be an element to consider. Congress, and the Service in its Regulations,
in an attempt to clarify and standardize the convenience of the employer doctrine,
established a set of inflexible requirements and rules to be followed in order to
acquire an exemption under section 119. The statute and Regulations have
failed to achieve their purpose because the convenience of the employer doctrine
is one of those areas in the law which does not lend itself to hard and fast
requirements and easy determinations.
It is suggested that the statute should be amended in such a way that the
doctrine is set forth in language expressing its very essence, leaving the Regula-
tions and case law to acknowledge the various elements or surrounding facts and
circumstances which will be held to establish the essential requirement of the
doctrine. The following is a suggested model of an amended version of section
119:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value
of any meals or lodging, or cash allowances in lieu thereof, furnished to him
by his employer. This exclusion shall apply only if it appears from all the
facts and circumstances that such meals, lodging or cash allowances are
furnished primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer.
The Regulations to accompany this provision should be restructured in such a
way that no distinction in the elements to be considered in any given factual
situation is made between meals and lodging received. The word "employee"
should be recognized as including any partner or shareholder who, after applying
the test of section 707, is found to be in an employer-employee relationship with
259 371 F.2d at 67.
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his respective partnership or corporation. In order to eliminate development of
non-statutory "requirements" and to avoid a reversion to the present, strict,
"hard and fast" rules, the Regulations should clearly state that any of the
facts or elements in a particular situation are to be relevant to a court or jury's
determination only to the extent that they give an indication of whether or not
the items furnished are primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer.
These facts or elements may include the present "requirements" discussed at
length in this Note, but by no means are these to be requisite or exclusive to a
proper resolution of the central issue in every section 119 case.
This Note has attempted to dissect the convenience of the employer doctrine
in order to expose the cancers which thrive within its application. It has also
indicated possible remedies to correct the malignancy. Hopefully Congress and
the Service will recognize the dire need for legislative and administrative surgery
in this important area of federal income taxation, and will provide for appropriate
amendments to section 119 and the Regulations.
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